Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7b1b332c653d62ef…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

103.5 KB Created: 2021-09-09 11:57:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2024-05-24
MD5: 0e78a7724bdd74c31a04c6bc97e23872 SHA-1: 68c3a20849957f0d08b4d26890fbc8feb76a3bc5 SHA-256: 7b1b332c653d62effffffd27a8da5bf78c0a5e5c1fb04191e0943333671c46c3
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a macro-enabled Word document (DOCM) that contains a Document_Open macro. This macro attempts to deceive the user with a fake error message to encourage content enablement. Upon enablement, it executes a VBA function that uses URLDownloadToFile to download a PowerShell script from 'http://45.140.147.81/doomsday.ps1' to 'C:\Users\Public\doomsday.ps1'. Subsequently, it uses Shell() to execute the downloaded PowerShell script.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
  • URLDownloadToFile in VBA critical OLE_VBA_DOWNLOAD
    URLDownloadToFile in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://45.140.147.81/doomsday.ps1
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
be10b35d31deeb3f4a383ffc853f3fa395f34c1a039abf864d2c1bd7764da842		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1108 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
dacc042d07a51ac51ba8fa7b6554956e463483548c5668dcf857d1fe483e870a		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 10240 bytes

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