Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7b152e9143f31374…

MALICIOUS

PDF

36.3 KB Created: 2020-10-30 19:14:29 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: 2d07507b82729f86ddd683312e49f537 SHA-1: bb48cbd27093f25fbe6d49860a8b185d412f9f1f SHA-256: 7b152e9143f313747da3e72dc64f29132b9ecb99dc70a74d8bd2fa647ef3a47f
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document was flagged as malicious by an ML classifier. The file embeds a large number of external links characteristic of an SEO link farm and routes users through malicious redirector infrastructure. Specific URLs and indicators for this sample are listed in the indicators section.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/123?keyword=ninja+cat+77 In PDF document text
    • https://zegojipoxe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131069766/guneb-gelomo-bawimemekug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://taburexil.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134374137/gunepurowo-nosekorirana.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dewisepiremutu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134318599/6638240.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rivisoni.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739016/widesisiba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://topodomero.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132696018/94079.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tekegalesi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740489/fowatipobow-zisofefimon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4392668/normal_5f96764c0fd06.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ridulajevu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134352946/bepelidibisaxam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://talowitutujuf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133999148/9505895.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gadigode.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132680949/zefonanuxo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6e5a603d-e009-4d11-b4ee-1e9d077f6597/3479894457.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8480147b-b09b-46ab-9e92-d12fb3f22204/beach_tent_walmart.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/7870/4536/files/xizulu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004666.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4666 4172 bytes
SHA-256: a70a843e67925abb7796bcca03c62c451cd73b45fb33297979610eed1bd25a0e
font_01_sfnt_off0000548e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x548E 10704 bytes
SHA-256: 0061d7747b1b20da5743ca3ed4b15d768f50b9bcffcb530e2402ff453b5b7a4a
font_02_sfnt_off000076da.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x76DA 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 9f355172d696dda274cac500966718f112ce76951f19577ac4888987ea6471b2