Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7b0f4015ce61a313…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

217.8 KB First seen: 2022-04-14
MD5: fc4549a989ee9bf08fdff506af00820a SHA-1: a4908c1d626e74552e7c1e8828a7bcf7e4bcda08 SHA-256: 7b0f4015ce61a313caff02c7ef299e129be1332f4dfc2290efd64a452e7fbb26
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with heuristics indicating that \objupdate forces OLE activation and that composite monikers are present. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'download the document and click Enable Editing', which is a common lure to bypass macro security. This suggests the embedded OLE objects are intended to be executed, likely to download and run a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000095d.bin
455fc6aa87c8c80ad3306fdae1174602917a5f1852c8e2bc3325b0657bc3f3a7
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x95D 15670 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s).
objdata_01_off0000894d.bin
36dcadcd9dba6c796320cf103eee4d99a0cf65218f74bac40d0f472a6487a1f8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x894D 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off00009ef0.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9EF0 12297 bytes