Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7b0876977d9b2e85…

MALICIOUS

RTF

32.5 KB First seen: 2023-07-03
MD5: 4f5cf5fbe9efe99aa65e82f460640ffa SHA-1: 80cdc361392dca635fe24c7e37c3d4e360ed0e52 SHA-256: 7b0876977d9b2e8562e8b95a67ce01c658371dc1cac1b4f58a3eb25007cf7bc5
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 PowerShell

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic for macro-based malware. The exploitation likely leads to the execution of a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004615.bin
242c508ffe3899df8dd61cab0a9bb00505bd6a5f3061f8d7bd82b1d91c8bcc13
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4615 1609 bytes