Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7b019e9fb455f6a1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

36.0 KB Created: 2020-11-02 08:38:46 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-04
MD5: 76bc8ca6e87be016f489706c478ab7fc SHA-1: dd0f2687530c19edb1600ce9fd53b0e02bde2c7f SHA-256: 7b019e9fb455f6a11f612ffc82c8b8fa7e6dc64e0dfeb6b18628f498ede2d421
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document was flagged as malicious by an ML classifier. The file embeds a large number of external links characteristic of an SEO link farm and routes users through malicious redirector infrastructure. Specific URLs and indicators for this sample are listed in the indicators section.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.link/123?keyword=twin+brothers+pizza+valdese+nc+menu In PDF document text
    • https://daletutanedura.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636587/fanugono.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4407998/normal_5f937fa4ad710.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://firerokuk.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164187/bd1afd2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366009/normal_5f8a092230f73.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kiseridebajesa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408791/xaxexeladosixigip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lafowesatumu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134503032/d8120a5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vonubaxuted.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452839/javapopesi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wifivufadabigo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134522009/gunurezare-xezudofowej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jutebipofan.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134334370/b2adc58f7e1ba2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xonuvalax.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437330/tabojudu-pusibumapabivis-furepepomam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://medizagokitoni.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303310/3b3da.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4383149/normal_5f999d4c2e9fa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pidivupam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134327465/e6e184068c58.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0499/1690/3585/files/kuzidolorazi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0497/9346/6517/files/vizobewu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004c20.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4C20 5604 bytes
SHA-256: ee9f3a384d2898dfdc2dc6d4b89c560680794655a95827806f44ec989bdedcf6
font_01_sfnt_off00005f18.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5F18 10428 bytes
SHA-256: 19eb2cbb140103aa0dd5838306e4bf7c616ca89d6bab670401c6df546b56b641