Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7af1ef25cfb603e1…

MALICIOUS

RTF

11.3 KB
MD5: 6e6b649405d4affc8a0a6c50e73ed43b SHA-1: 350b95772d66618dfd3500bfb528e300c78823d3 SHA-256: 7af1ef25cfb603e1e9b582926f5334d59b2720c015588c31acd1bb8f641c81ce
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object specifically identified as an Equation Editor object, which is a known vector for exploiting CVE-2017-11882. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED` heuristics strongly indicates this exploit is present and intended for client-side execution. The `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristic further suggests that the object is configured to activate automatically.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001bdd.bin
291379d59758ff029e918ffd7911149bde3d1fc62c6da294334e97f9ff1be4a1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1BDD 1588 bytes