Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7ae5ca5559c5a2c4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.32 MB
MD5: adf1b6020b5820c4cf5fa6560f1ba54e SHA-1: 57e3ca403c9244f0b69a8f37811b24d39160cadb SHA-256: 7ae5ca5559c5a2c4e21ef72ce6db53d7d2fcedc005d42982ac9db5063bcb4ebd
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The OOXML file is encrypted with a default password and contains an Equation Editor OLE object, a known carrier for exploits. The Equation Editor object exhibits an anomaly where it carries a payload-like Ole10Native stream, suggesting it's designed to deliver a secondary exploit or payload. The presence of multiple high-severity heuristics related to Equation Editor OLE objects and exploit carriers strongly indicates malicious intent.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Equation Editor object carries payload-like Ole10Native stream high OLE_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE_PAYLOAD_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object declares the Equation Editor CLSID but stores a large high-entropy Ole10Native stream with malformed package sizing. This is exploit-shaped Equation/OLE payload evidence.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.