Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7ae3fcda576d63d1…

MALICIOUS

RTF

620.8 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: c3e0a82a132476d5f1bdae7a03e3de4d SHA-1: 63d106c7a630755d0f34798c92f47c495841a090 SHA-256: 7ae3fcda576d63d137a6ee440bd4b0a60990134fdde02b457d08198d963ace4c
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF document contains critical heuristic firings for Equation Editor and CVE-2017-8759, indicating exploitation of a vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. This suggests the document is designed to execute arbitrary code upon opening. No specific malware family was identified, but the exploitation technique is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0009680e.bin
e95e3ab2e662cfd10612465bc61773ec0aa8d8999fdca92e5e8caa47bafb7f17
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9680E 3739 bytes