Emotet — Office (OOXML) / .DOCX malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7adf027cfbacb9e2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

128.2 KB Created: 2020-01-31 19:51:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 14eefe4d3be5871b66636b62a5f083f6 SHA-1: 62a2a39ae544311cda0bddb76d7282a2d6f0602a SHA-256: 7adf027cfbacb9e234e80ea5563bb9f7e1dcd003c562a6964c9c65524abcf3d4
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is identified as malicious by ClamAV with the signature Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7572568-0. Static analysis revealed the presence of VBA macros, specifically a Document_Open macro and a GetObject call, which are commonly used for malicious purposes. The heuristics and ClamAV detection strongly suggest this is an Emotet downloader variant. No specific download URLs were extracted from the document body or scripts, but the presence of the Document_Open macro indicates the intent to execute malicious code upon opening.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7572568-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7572568-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
a71145193195d630bbbb9b725f41cf788d53ed78b46fb15c64af4740ef8b7fdd
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 8693 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
6cc11208bac065088f79d8cf4b4eb24fe65ead1c5c19a3ef2ac67601bcd742c7
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 56320 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-7572568-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).