Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7ac32887311ff082…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.8 KB Created: 2021-09-13 16:32:09 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: edbcf397a44bedbcc9231504588d82f3 SHA-1: 52880e03726bbb8ef5e054ee8e31f86fcdafbcf7 SHA-256: 7ac32887311ff082e862717a7e5260b185108d42a1e9b7832c9cd83fde9b3b69
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs pointing to compromised WordPress sites and disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The presence of a 'download button' heuristic and ClamAV detection as 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan' strongly indicates a phishing or malware distribution attempt. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the overall structure and URL patterns are consistent with a malicious PDF dropper.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9917

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://coretry.ru/uplcv?utm_term=android+2d+game+development+engine PDF link annotation
    • http://charmingcurls.se/upload/file/12376466844.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ekotop.eu/userfiles/file/58200866788.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lockerova.eu/admin/upload/documents/86938237421.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://www.andyselfstorage.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4h6ri2al83ipgb8hhhjc2godck/45049967333.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://79.170.40.182/boothtastic.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161362f99bcd1c---godegawarotu.pdfPDF link annotation
    • https://zenithservicos.com/userfiles/files/waxejoxelilabokoxeselamaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://styliststudios.com/imagesTE/file/70358128673.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://minipowerpack.net/upload/files/tumodo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pamukoglu.com/userfiles/file/xovelejimejogenori.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://limberhurstgallery.com/imageuploads/file/nutukolizabamen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://deshpanday.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/tusupugimejikazavo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hndgyl.com/v15/Upload/file/2021982227396238.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://girisimhaber.com/uploads/file/kewunut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lokalizacja-gps.pl/userfiles/file/zanisivovijudademasu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://studiotecnicoprato.eu/userfiles/files/86303660824.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bellamy.tw/uploads/files/202109052006045101.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.inter-tube.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fed26c0e3edcc552e662a1719f47fefb/66296073762.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://arcomproltd.com/userfiles/file/tifubezelafebit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aaexpansionjoint.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161389f97b71f5---jibonimawavedowuve.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cinebuzz.be/uploads/userfiles/files/sutabegufigowodeluwe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://blossomtour.net/FileData/ckfinder/files/20210913_FF4675468A64CDE8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hyundaidongdo3s.com/images/files/15061079984.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ariaparvaz.com/basefile/ariaparvazcom/files/xokuparafafajifisiboz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alpha-cp.com/userfiles/file/jiduxolaneluf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vit-physio.de/file/tenubexulunenof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ingmarcofaedi.com/userfiles/files/23997640386.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ekotop.eu/userfiIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000de6c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDE6C 17664 bytes
SHA-256: 327cbf491ea50eaaad97055071480f28a9b1d94b410267400b79e94716faedf8
font_01_sfnt_off00010cdd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10CDD 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off000124f4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x124F4 10732 bytes
SHA-256: d03702a73515a98eb5b368ca7887e6b2577502ac5bce1ed5c5fcac7acd1de074

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