Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7aa2bfbdee7101f1…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

5.53 MB First seen: 2022-11-15
MD5: 8c0242fa82e2ea603076d75ca562c7fc SHA-1: 72388945f5748a7fe420dbd4857b4302a76adc9b SHA-256: 7aa2bfbdee7101f17f85398857179a07487740df5d7c55c1ebdfe65c4b99dce8
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an OLE object with decoded Equation Editor payload, strongly indicating the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882. The presence of a PE file within the OLE object suggests it acts as a dropper for a secondary malicious payload. The excessive hex data further supports the hiding of such a payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
  • Decoded Equation Editor payload + PE critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF decodes to an Equation Editor ProgID adjacent to OLE activation and the same decoded object stream contains embedded PE bytes. This matches the Equation Editor exploit surface used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 documents, while requiring payload evidence to avoid flagging benign Equation references.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~5793KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000076.bin
fec74e0a714993f1587a12cda2ea5797ee6ae1a7372532795bdd1183d7ecaf5b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x76 2896976 bytes