Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7a97229ab5c1e0fb…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

152.5 KB Created: 2025-12-01 02:37:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: c762581ddd5a6741513e35db24d6de3a SHA-1: 3c1f1121dbdc2b65d5583dc1450f1058447f4f7e SHA-256: 7a97229ab5c1e0fb376635abfa1c2833344b326b5e00d01be978c9cc1d7d263e
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1140 Deobfuscate or Obfuscate Malicious Code T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The macros utilize WScript.Shell to interact with the system, specifically accessing the 'Templates' special folder. The 'Shell()' and 'CreateObject()' calls within the VBA code indicate an intent to download and execute a second-stage payload, as suggested by the 'OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC' heuristic. The document body's instruction to 'Enable content' serves as a social engineering lure.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
fb005c0d0c5ad0785e6176baf58d72cf7a7fbbca72582f9065304e3bcd283beb
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 15827 bytes