Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7a93d6c8ab275e9a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.7 KB Created: 2020-07-08 15:47:57 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 875d1870aa2b18d37f7d2ea0f2fc14cc SHA-1: d7034815b66b8fde92b6f53eb425c35eae88c4be SHA-256: 7a93d6c8ab275e9aebdd37748b9d2b0af10eea51c62f4f08257505cbd6ca0887
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, with one identified as a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text related to 'Blumeria graminis pdf' and a URL that aligns with the malicious redirector. This suggests the file is part of a link farm or SEO poisoning campaign designed to direct users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=blumeria%20graminis%20pdf
    • http://files.getitwright.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776788/pufim-fafopunatobi.pdf
    • http://files.appletreecontractors.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607712/9709263.pdf
    • http://files.biggsbassethounds.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857071/84fb7a2093dbc.pdf
    • http://files.swerochester.org/uploads/1/3/0/9/130970014/9ab31f.pdf
    • http://files.livingmetroeast.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739769/kigatod.pdf
    • http://files.wilmingtonprintandmail.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637057/cd8bc305482.pdf
    • http://files.illinoisdelta.org/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681938/2186787.pdf
    • http://files.legacyhorselogging.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636990/rakofidi-tuxujojaxeki.pdf
    • http://files.prehistoriccollector.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164351/womasijin.pdf
    • http://files.cambderma.co.uk/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380953/barudepazotakid.pdf
    • http://files.dunbarband.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379951/6b2c0c5611b7.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://tesodufow.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/seziwetafo.pdf
    • https://jubujotilo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/14099877296.pdf
    • https://zirazeru.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/56253942999.pdf
    • https://dabatesi.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/karafikibev.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010f6e.bin
98a0e2dec20653dee066b7885e41a80fa2bc45b24706dede8e5e342c48673401
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10F6E 5104 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000120a4.bin
d7b5810676b80cfe963b1ab28d8a44b0c4928691b3f098c630176d091d0eddd9
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x120A4 10440 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001447b.bin
43dd7310e986e37c0562d6efd2a67b6291a0d41fa892ecd43b306c3e7231f7b7
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1447B 16148 bytes