Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7a6aa37cc6bfe2a4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

127.0 KB Created: 2017-11-06 15:14:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: 3f7539b0193c58f1f3435b7ef8b013a5 SHA-1: d280a5362fb2036d0fab525aefb2bad719047577 SHA-256: 7a6aa37cc6bfe2a4f2f265e3d3b5134e5211852783e0ce9c09ec003d7c66a86d
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The file contains an embedded OLE object with indicators of a payload or link, specifically identified as a potential CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape. ClamAV detections indicate a dropper and phishing lure. The embedded URL http://saranville.com/12 is highly suspicious and likely serves as the initial download source for a second-stage payload. The extracted artifact also shows PowerShell-related signatures, suggesting it may be responsible for further execution.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6362648-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Img.Dropper.PhishingLure-6362648-0
  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (1 URL) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
    An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://saranville.com/12 In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 4608 bytes
SHA-256: 6904c14995643d2f65b03dab334a8c27bccbbf18d1ac4930276f904c1d759634
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Dropper.Powershell-6368805-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): powershell.exe, PowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 2359 bytes
SHA-256: 3c561350c8e0ca3fa2e4a8fa39a76f68be904c894cc2cd230e002905e29b3771
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): powershell.exe, PowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5424 bytes
SHA-256: 5723e14ee216a46f28582d5d60db5599c7142567b9f6892decf1babbe1f94dce

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.