Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7a62914abb015a41…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

272.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2026-02-23
MD5: 0dbf5605b6548acb12369f2830eca4f7 SHA-1: a8433977a00f284c15145394947212180653d5da SHA-256: 7a62914abb015a41dcf5f7990e50f9f8277b09b2e0080750b1426ca6331808ec
150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This exploit is known to deliver a secondary payload, in this case, an embedded PDF. The presence of the Equation Editor OLE object and the CVE-2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE heuristic strongly indicate exploitation for client execution. The VBA macros are empty, suggesting the primary malicious functionality is within the OLE object.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://evertype.comhttp://tulrich.comCopyright
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLRupakaraRegularRupakara

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
860fdf3e97908f84768b527b024b1632132321109e3ddc45e6b608678c0e2ba3		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD010EB8A9/Ole10nAtive 1525 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00001575.bin
41c2901ebda5b5d79d4a68e71278578ac4fe004bea942385b0ed0c502c07b584		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1575 88240 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
ea8e2dfbb25d787cf71744f0c87e8486e2082ae9260f3ae58d9077b7127c2599		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 274432 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00012400.pdf
4a37a9ff245e173b9f2369b78424277be2034e22a4128f84435a3e14c2e0242b		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x12400 203776 bytes

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