Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7a54dd836540f2fd…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.54 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2022-12-05
MD5: ea894b1543043db760ef0117832731de SHA-1: e339adf9c0b98ee01c56aa12e48c3e66bdbc70ea SHA-256: 7a54dd836540f2fde5140f317bfa2a44b0d6c9443c8f619d38367f377c01512f
148 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE indicates the file contains a payload designed to exploit this specific vulnerability. The presence of an Equation Editor OLE object further supports this. The VBA macros appear to be boilerplate and do not contain executable logic, suggesting the exploit is directly embedded within the OLE object. The file's purpose is to leverage this known exploit for initial code execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EAX) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EAX)
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
1d3b71b8c6234aace88f31f6e674b07383e015a2e68993dcd4fc2526aa470fe5
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2412 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
b3c8b57df670529a8ff6e6e64c59120a00aed1aedca2d146c0d502c7113d9439
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00BF519F/Ole10Native 1237 bytes