Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7a3f7a132024029a…

MALICIOUS

RTF

40.1 KB First seen: 2023-05-18
MD5: 75cb3ce69d1607a1fddb8c3add1220e1 SHA-1: dbf679b517b6442fc9f0a6fa05c0abeb35651c6d SHA-256: 7a3f7a132024029aa8364e45be47f31ca32e248315ffc781072142665a5743c3
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the OLE object will be activated automatically upon opening, and the "SE_ENABLE_LURE" heuristic suggests the document prompts the user to enable editing. This combination strongly indicates an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability to execute arbitrary code, likely for a secondary payload download.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004920.bin
391cf7d5616831aa8fa891d4cdb5ff90a3e6edf17617019807cc56a54e149963
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4920 2006 bytes