Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7a3188668cd5ef9e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

25.0 KB
MD5: 4f51af14d712b6214c64090a79cb228b SHA-1: 6bf1f72ade16239db6cc14d13191b11278308dd6 SHA-256: 7a3188668cd5ef9ed4e17d9f41a9b5eb22690eb9d6151caf9933f121bfbcedbe
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF file contains multiple high-severity heuristic firings related to OLE object data, automatic linking, and updates, indicating the exploitation of OLE vulnerabilities. The presence of `RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM` suggests an embedded OLE object that is likely designed to execute code or download a secondary payload. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide clear textual lures. Therefore, the primary attack vector appears to be the exploitation of OLE object vulnerabilities within the RTF structure.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002090.bin
10aedb66c6a6858e58a73dc9a00f1d35edf2d565df9849b9bac0cc0b7c2bd8ab
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2090 4181 bytes