Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7a2dca21052c7934…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.6 KB
MD5: 66e9452d13d00e80b80b632af441b425 SHA-1: 74f73fded315248911162a6bcefd1aa498fd3f4b SHA-256: 7a2dca21052c79340468f2216e7b1a07ee843452f690b23f1c66b85b576462d7
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common technique for delivering exploits via email attachments.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b6.bin
b290990a9c67dde4ef3040aec420e4aad00874ea2b703270926097e135c88fbc
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB6 1619 bytes