Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7a2a911f169bc795…

MALICIOUS

PDF

66.3 KB Created: 2020-12-30 06:05:27 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-16
MD5: 0dca2556c6f04ceb9d6d1e282a5c2802 SHA-1: 938630ca6497350c36d25e87031d35dec9da2c67 SHA-256: 7a2a911f169bc795e342c424244a2a2fa799b26aff06294802a40f9dab3fd0ae
244 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable domains or redirector services, indicating a link farm designed to drive traffic to malicious sites. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely for phishing or ad fraud. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure itself facilitates the redirection.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?utm_term=rogue+soul+2+kizi In PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4487927/normal_5fe5793a85c8c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4388050/normal_5f912139b9a63.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sanuvexugivi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606490/2488786.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jaduxokapatusiw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135301375/abe30.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://voziguwotameba.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134345279/ffc40040a9e2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4424666/normal_5fbe73cf92aa7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4455902/normal_5fac0f0da89fa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xananitape.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134095977/5214930.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rugurujumififez.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384765/fukepubofarijo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tubemugipowiw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134345788/38dde32fc5402.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b9de8934-bde9-4879-a3e4-00b9b2d2b0ab/56859422906.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d24d51c1-a0ea-43f4-937e-278b728269f3/mozonov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ca33.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCA33 4800 bytes
SHA-256: 4ea441ed22d2a27172f5ceafa164c45befd378def0a490bedd541bf188999319
font_01_sfnt_off0000dab6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDAB6 10000 bytes
SHA-256: 1c7ff8c3917ab7902bef15da401c2e15fb3180371e73c8c45a2277632c4055b1

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