Emotet — Office (OLE) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7a20adc14eedee96…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

164.5 KB
MD5: f478137e6d85859bc62b73a9bd3a1e98 SHA-1: 2919aaeada8e05bea53141190cb67ae2e06faca4 SHA-256: 7a20adc14eedee96591f3f10da2623860f3adfb5c70d6603bad7802045e11c81
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a Document_Open VBA macro that is heavily obfuscated and uses CreateObject to execute code. This behavior is characteristic of Emotet downloaders. The macro's primary function appears to be downloading and executing a second-stage payload, as indicated by the 'auto-exec + custom decoder + CreateObject/Shell/exec sink' heuristic. The ClamAV signature further supports the Emotet family attribution.

Heuristics 7

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed0121-9822961-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed0121-9822961-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
70cde1a7768c914d768cc1a9e45a0e017daeffeaf31f2cd2ffc5285d23649526		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 13216 bytes

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