Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7a1c8845ca806efd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

1000.5 KB Created: 2010-05-26 20:26:47 -01:00 Authoring application: Acrobat PDFMaker 6.0 for Word (via Acrobat Distiller 6.0 (Windows))
MD5: a37606a851215a489791a3b4e1c717ec SHA-1: 8cff93c32466e28cb623d9796573448ba65c484a SHA-256: 7a1c8845ca806efd759ee4a4d4652bb8c3bbd0c3c16d4fd0352157e21ca2a862
414 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell T1204 User Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

This PDF document exploits CVE-2010-1240 via a Launch action that executes cmd.exe. The embedded JavaScript is designed to drop and execute an embedded file named 'qin.pdf', which is identified as a Windows executable. The primary intent appears to be the execution of a secondary payload, likely a downloader or dropper, facilitated by the exploit.

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\qin.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Optional Content Group with action trigger low PDF_OPTIONAL_CONTENT
    Optional Content Group (layer) co-occurs with an action trigger — content can be selectively hidden from viewers or scanners while the action still fires on open
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.QinetiQ.com)/S/URI
    • http://www.qinetiq.com/investors)/S/URI
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
qin.pdf
c6a91cba00bf87cdb064c49adaac82255cbec6fdd48fd21f9b3b96abf019916b		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 11230 at offset 0x9AC89 918528 bytes
javascript_obj11231_000.js
3f7c9c0fdaf638b6d200300f34bad8685699f2fb35a80decc4b9838dc6de5b8e		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 11231 at offset 0xF9BBE 52 bytes
stream_011_off00003c11.bin
5999bc8f56de77f50c1e91070d12dca014f5c5a2d12a300f6c336fc2bbd05168		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x3C11 11268 bytes
icc_00_off000031ab.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x31AB 3144 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00039a88.bin
a25417d36cb1fe4ab76d5c6e2cd1c37e40bd68f88421edf4dcdac79e99a98d5c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x39A88 30296 bytes

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