Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7a0f181caf82c5a7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

238.5 KB Created: 2016-07-11 11:47:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2018-11-13
MD5: 8a0e332b9f9c0a11e5fd849c7217522b SHA-1: 901cc40ee0f69534c4b247a366ab16f51a5b5985 SHA-256: 7a0f181caf82c5a7f791cb441be0b19848fb1607e746428a495030fa07669aee
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The critical heuristic indicates auto-execution with execution tokens, and the VBA code itself contains obfuscated logic that likely attempts to download and execute a secondary payload. The presence of legacy WordBasic auto-exec markers further supports malicious intent.

Heuristics 4

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-1538711 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-1538711
  • VBA macros detected medium 1 related finding OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1077 bytes
SHA-256: 651c3030f48967343c2783e5fa80181b4341e7668adbeab71d1b99b41f0f7bfa
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "formalistic"

Attribute VB_Name = "unattainably"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{27C19CE4-9127-4DAC-B991-66010C78DB3B}{C96CE4A3-0121-4E6E-90A9-1B8B5ABF0175}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Private Sub UserForm_Scroll(ByVal ActionX As MSForms.fmScrollAction, ByVal ActionY As MSForms.fmScrollAction, ByVal RequestDx As Single, ByVal RequestDy As Single, ByVal ActualDx As MSForms.ReturnSingle, ByVal ActualDy As MSForms.ReturnSingle)
orb = formalistic.undescriptive
flanked = sqr(orb)
flanked = Round(flanked)
Do While flanked <> 50
formalistic.pythium
flanked = flanked + 1
Loop
End Sub

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.