Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 79ff7637f45e07bf…

MALICIOUS

PDF

56.7 KB Created: 2020-09-16 22:41:11 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: a9ad239bfc8412e8271a2856eabaaf25 SHA-1: 055d935965134e39eec42ca4ad5ef712a0595e0a SHA-256: 79ff7637f45e07bf4ff683fff9eeb9dbf78f0cbf61fd3b5f5e208d19497b94c6
150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, with one specifically pointing to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though malformed, contains text suggesting a lure related to 'where the wild things are full pdf' and includes the malicious URL. This indicates a social engineering attempt to redirect users to malicious infrastructure, likely for malware distribution or phishing. The presence of multiple PDF links and a malicious redirector strongly suggests a link farm or SEO poisoning attack.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.link/wix?keyword=where+the+wild+things+are+full+pdf
    • http://files.arisefromtheashes.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606295/mopiguwele-wopapolufapol-zoxabiv.pdf
    • http://files.la-fll.org/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070313/2597918.pdf
    • http://danolab.greatgorillarun.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775373/7547220.pdf
    • http://files.smashmouthsweetsllc.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695470/kagideriterujo_bajixadukugufot.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7272/4897/files/garodegat.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5604/5981/files/elementary_lesson_plan_template_editable.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/3764/6245/files/53598975655.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/9067/1771/files/bamorusetosesurap.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/4601/0022/files/82822803122.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/5501/4298/files/muputamureg.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/84770620138.pdf
    • https://76b16949-3664-49eb-a989-f700e9f83932.filesusr.com/ugd/10cedf_3f587ef79b80496d9bfa78e7707e6420.pdf?index=true
    • https://9fdaf96f-9d23-440e-9e39-b04b540d41fc.filesusr.com/ugd/834936_288187f7ed0544c8a57e151898c12c75.pdf?index=true
    • https://70959d93-e771-4b22-ac6e-dce310db0d9e.filesusr.com/ugd/daca0d_6f7227a8b5f04410a7281d9d6c52b6e9.pdf?index=true
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00009ef0.bin
6b6f218f9c10f29061856eeb249220c8bd96de11d60820fc4bbdc4ee04233c50
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9EF0 5408 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000b171.bin
9c591c2736b2e18a275ccf0002f2481f3efd2475353eff8dbb0280f3fae28629
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB171 10696 bytes