RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 79fc92cfced85064

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

368.4 KB

MD5: ad124894b2f35645cc2ff02d58626964 SHA-1: 3051238eea5b119c139fa49c9aec55a077a33713 SHA-256: 79fc92cfced8506495957204db2ce4a5fd083481685cb864efa201f7d5fc3464

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of OLE object exploitation, including \objdata, \objemb, \objautlink, and \objupdate. The \objupdate heuristic, in particular, strongly suggests an Equation Editor exploit. The document also contains a lure to enable macros or editing, indicating a likely dropper functionality. While no specific scripts were extracted, the overall structure points to a malicious OLE object designed to execute arbitrary code, likely for downloading further stages.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000965.bin` `7e743dea1bba0ba595bae31e08aef6d08fcd13358679db1b2ccc19cbe6c33288`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x965	76400 bytes
`objdata_01_off00007114.bin` `808e4dd4f04b1cba5b79b12fb9a1a36fd7de1299b371a0605cd4920559c64bea`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x7114	76373 bytes
`objdata_02_off0002de3d.bin` `a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2DE3D	2632 bytes
`objdata_03_off0002f3e0.bin` `e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2F3E0	12297 bytes

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