Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 79a6667699d67913…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.6 KB Created: 2020-04-10 20:31:56 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.1.4 (via Qt 4.8.6)
MD5: cc7603a21872b8751f7bc9a817fe321c SHA-1: 6285ae949c2fdd26a87d2a329fa3d71fe5ba16de SHA-256: 79a6667699d6791376285c14a94f862d02ed897ee380623c97fc76b00d3e0cc9
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links to other PDF files hosted on various domains, indicating a link farm or redirection scheme. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, and the heuristic firings confirm the presence of numerous external links. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the structure suggests a potential for JavaScript execution within the PDF to facilitate these redirects.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://jimmyscribbles.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130489841/130489841.html#metodo+teacch+pdf
    • http://shepherdjrotc.net/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407709/6403553.pdf
    • http://stayplussuites.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383264/2406269b4f.pdf
    • http://niaspurpose.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775710/kadug_fepibu_fuwetifezelavo_pufaxosadupegas.pdf
    • http://thebathbakery.net/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775950/jonomipafibebaditow.pdf
    • http://zenessweettreats.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131378915/zonumagowin.pdf
    • http://harborhillsbowl.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130621896/goziwafevasisox.pdf
    • http://cornerstoneinmercer.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453352/5617868.pdf
    • http://honeypotyonisteams.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130590162/fikemawo-vebekikoli-fomakununo-difamav.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007759.bin
d8449897efb3e867487ffcd350c1616cad83aa105457202532ea7b7d9c7e7ffc		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7759 9416 bytes

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