Office (OLE) / .DOCX malware analysis — malicious · 799d1962acdfe2e9

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

1.30 MB Created: 2021-06-23 12:51:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word

MD5: 13ad085981594a67e0ef50f4bf79b2de SHA-1: 3005e216b3b70ea8a3b57e6b31da69fdba588430 SHA-256: 799d1962acdfe2e9d2975ce6d0e9eb93fef44da5e15fec525950e027fb4a7fae

662 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.003 Scheduled Task/Job T1071.001 System Information Discovery T1566.001 Phishing T1071.002 Network Discovery T1071.003 Collection T1071.004 Lateral Movement

The file exhibits multiple indicators of malicious activity, including the embedded PE executable, VBA macros with execution tokens, and API calls like WinExec and ShellExecute. The VBA macro attempts to download and execute a DLL, likely a secondary payload. The use of VirtualAlloc and LoadLibrary further suggests an attempt to establish a secure environment for executing the payload. The ClamAV detection confirms the file's malicious nature. The document excerpts highlight the use of API calls for command execution and memory allocation, consistent with a downloader or dropper.

Heuristics 17

Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT

OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is CVE-2007-3893/MS07-046-family evidence when paired with Office exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed EMF record is not proven by this rule alone.
OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514

Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE

MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Jrat-6336393-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Jrat-6336393-1
ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV

ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC

Reference to WinExec API
Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC

Reference to ShellExecute API
Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY

Reference to LoadLibrary API
Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS

Reference to GetProcAddress API
Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN

Document_Open macro
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ

CreateObject call
Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE

OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC

Reference to VirtualAlloc API
VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains VBA macro code
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `b63fa2303f27e014e38c8c1471933c1dbb661e0d8d57af7ef2b73e4c07a34a03`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	2719 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
`embedded_office_0008fa71.exe` `6504d3410e6e5a924b561ac6f8b0a7b35b37d2efc1b13510235f811c305fd592`	embedded-pe	Office MZ+PE at offset 0x8FA71	778127 bytes
Detection ClamAV: Win.Packed.Midie-10008727-0 Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
`ole10native_00.bin` `208d0da2ffc20b13ac0b3502a7427f0847d72a748e45de6baefd4ede6ae974a6`	ole-package	OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1685932843/Ole10Native	738613 bytes

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