Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7984bb431bc3d69d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.1 KB Created: 2021-04-19 07:23:05 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-24
MD5: e1d0f80e4f206317320d61cc932afe7c SHA-1: 16b684b8d472db9e725c022d496e506d3b130575 SHA-256: 7984bb431bc3d69dd504367cef90fd6f9118d0745001143e6e8bd48728f16d2c
166 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF document was flagged as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier. It uses a LOLBin command-execution lure. The file embeds a large number of external links characteristic of an SEO link farm. Specific URLs and indicators for this sample are listed in the indicators section.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://botokaw.ru/strik?utm_term=pmd+beauty+microderm+pro+reviews PDF link annotation
    • http://on24-system.club/4997733621813oxj.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://kalavar.xyz/vusevodowokaf3740k.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369179/normal_60360358eac93.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4403819/normal_605502428581c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://merishwheelrecords.com/summary_of_little_red_riding_hood_fairy_talemj7sy.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://polystate.ru/17222432957edjxc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4375353/normal_604d3e1a304b1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4392649/normal_5fce850b1e7ca.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://weribemuludozeb.epizy.com/what_is_linguistics_in_simple_words.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zevusup.atwebpages.com/windows_powershell_ise_keeps_freezing.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tuxenipup/74800343216.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://katiwepu.rf.gd/history_of_red_fort.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c7d7e0a0-3f80-4426-b51a-5a0040f9f583/xukigome.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gomaxod/87069064415.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mubefula/tijesisipu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nubirumoxid.onlinewebshop.net/astable_multivibrator_using_bjt.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://laxolivavaru.epizy.com/95419958205.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c912c192-9dd8-4e0b-832b-209a459d34e6/vuvasixinugiboboxi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/17f125f6-6337-4745-80dd-fa6a22b9a633/what_is_a_word_that_starts_with_os.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/80941559-89f4-4590-adde-5aa8046077cd/2012_dodge_avenger_tire_size_p225_55r17_se__sxt.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f2e5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF2E5 5580 bytes
SHA-256: 764e336ca0b6038893b6cc9672d9322ec466705ec82e3415e23cea2416a3e616
font_01_sfnt_off000105d9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x105D9 10788 bytes
SHA-256: a27ba764e2b13131b647a06e99285f103f92b014e73ec356c242b736bae3a626