RTF malware analysis — malicious · 79760a303d924139

MALICIOUS

RTF

91.3 KB First seen: 2023-08-15

MD5: d8ef7922b1509acfad4b11d0aa71987a SHA-1: 843a2aaddd30e4ff7c375f4dc7986d0b110c58db SHA-256: 79760a303d924139c197bd8cb810d63f93d4fc62cd2858dda1e33a1b3b54f197

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor, and uses an \objupdate directive to force its activation. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'click Enable editing from the yellow bar above', a common tactic to bypass macro security. This combination strongly suggests an exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00003e8c.bin` `54860092b60496799ed7bb69b11132864ac2eab296d2677bcfbd999e673319dc`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x3E8C	1630 bytes

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