Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 796c9f29274a0b94…

MALICIOUS

RTF

8.1 KB First seen: 2018-11-13
MD5: c5f49a15227ed9f42c18f400906afee4 SHA-1: 79f4e82d35060a27dd7618cf5a5293a0e21f8386 SHA-256: 796c9f29274a0b94d75bd3561a77de3ffc5a8ec91fa461bcadc0cde1f338e613
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that exploits the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution, indicating the file is designed to compromise the user's system. The presence of the Equation Editor CLSID and the specific FONT record overflow signature strongly points to this exploit.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6934206-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6934206-0
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003f.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3F 4130 bytes
SHA-256: 151e3fa7f92a22cd99693724a1a6ac72de8be511e0aade88098114f7145e6709