Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 793bdb2d4b52cc17…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.4 KB Created: 2020-11-10 22:14:15 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-06-15
MD5: df077187d1ab948b79549be3bc059eb5 SHA-1: c54d9f9737346a0ec3d10d4bd765e452a3f1243d SHA-256: 793bdb2d4b52cc170ec150899ee77bf3594ad8021304f2afce9a7fb970ea5a8b
264 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/strik?keyword=messenger+apk+pc In PDF document text
    • https://rikisuluwujufa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452938/mojedepiwovefofe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368481/normal_5f9ce7f73effd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kolivobaka.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134500933/25a98caf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xupotigoxurope.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134657266/8817864.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ragidogatekanex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134388076/1549919.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://manoxumumaxu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134472756/bda6262b80.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365624/normal_5f871adbc6359.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wejibuxod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740202/jodezepamada.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mosozedap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856454/e5a2f50270a466.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lodazojamuva/zepumu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c60b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC60B 12580 bytes
SHA-256: 45ca6ea410a80f7adfa4ca084e2c89106ca04b90f7c3ad6aaa8979c639b1f056
font_01_sfnt_off0000ee93.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE93 5136 bytes
SHA-256: 190e2c8eaf630a1de439930a7b59c65b893b6a3826c0a79b671e54cc41c261bd
font_02_sfnt_off0001002c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1002C 10872 bytes
SHA-256: 4161f8229283108e84e60718a16af27b4bfe523df1a4ed22762698e796c5c15f