Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7937b8168f96cf63…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.6 KB Created: 2021-02-15 16:15:18 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: d1141dc39eab91aa0ec8f60f89c21e8e SHA-1: 5e287fce47810844aabc83a6ab88a9e54994ffc0 SHA-256: 7937b8168f96cf6394fd1f2c159d1fb91dd5af164023592ee223a89f14f07873
252 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting or known malicious redirectors, indicating a link farm designed to distribute malware or phish users. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier further support its malicious nature. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs suggest an attempt to lure users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/123?utm_term=emule+server+list+kad
    • https://sixebujexe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740217/1018308.pdf
    • https://fuviwamirami.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135351498/rujaki-debevilib-bodozuxu-tavekizebu.pdf
    • https://lapulefad.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815180/ff3724.pdf
    • https://jedexapotup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134472831/e3e30c905c08610.pdf
    • https://wonakusoxenim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135340368/madubobifupumaj.pdf
    • http://nasevozowu.22web.org/vunav.pdf
    • https://niguzagum.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135390192/nevovugatil.pdf
    • https://digutejuwunapon.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135325267/04587b4.pdf
    • https://womegirig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134506381/nawavapamaronaluko.pdf
    • https://sesuzefodapu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815176/9567229.pdf
    • https://jobalexaxikut.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134892204/sodusixo.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/nisoxow/bluestacks_64_bit_windows_8.pdf
    • http://vepejatudededok.rf.gd/intoxicao_por_benzodiazepinicos.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lowebemuwojiso/janidavupazi.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000facd.bin
c22bbf1409d6db0b80add45c5ef4fcc4aca6f58189217b8f997f31607ffd8335		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFACD 5052 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00010bec.bin
a25e83b1fa87a87e248766666f2336ae6a14cdaca6103f0417547af6a3a5b310		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10BEC 11072 bytes

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