Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7910d1b3e82bf43b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

95.2 KB Created: 2020-08-10 12:42:53 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 2bde8966a2362a9ab6a2cfb3b17df0fb SHA-1: 570d76f55f30b294e2185a84caaf669125a9bd8f SHA-256: 7910d1b3e82bf43b18cd1738d8837820f6e216b2914fa2296226497c29f33083
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a link to a known malicious redirector, ttraff.com, which is likely used to obscure the final destination of the malicious payload. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the same redirector URL, suggesting it's the primary lure. The heuristic 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' indicates a common tactic of disguising malicious content as a password-protected archive, further supporting a phishing or malware delivery intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=atmosfera+pdf+zanichelli
    • http://files.indigoinsight.ca/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437689/12b4b18ad785b6d.pdf
    • http://files.hijabeautiful.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739831/5151712.pdf
    • http://firukor.geniigroup.co.uk/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164250/9887474.pdf
    • http://files.wettexttees.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132696113/4952185.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/5415/4406/files/66734552830.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/6195/9069/files/78006173400.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/4085/0598/files/17530228454.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/6509/6857/files/26109165844.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/3204/1889/files/action_research_journal.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/7955/7539/files/28607256806.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/7539/3944/files/lobidaxot.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/7552/6042/files/dog_fucks_girls.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/3598/4029/files/teachers_day_quotes_in_english.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/87294954422.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00011e16.bin
4976dd068bc51d216b455b6e96b64ca28251f6c00005f6932349d6ca7139b149		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11E16 5220 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00012faa.bin
02464a1fe1afb90ecf29b73b4ea1f78e636710264f7aef2919789e76902aeee2		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12FAA 16004 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00016020.bin
05d2457133b820fa77aa358e30e9acfbad3f04c46ced9a37296d9311117db176		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x16020 4324 bytes

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