Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 790c61c18090ee8a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.7 KB
MD5: b805fad4a23ed66d29b87d46af754251 SHA-1: 35df801001e91a29d520afea325021ee0325cb5f SHA-256: 790c61c18090ee8ab42f69e887f637b3482a506840862312bf9e8c1b98c94f6f
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically related to Equation Editor. High-severity heuristics indicate the presence of CVE-2017-11882, a known vulnerability that allows for arbitrary code execution when exploited. The ".objupdate" directive further suggests an attempt to force the activation of this embedded object, likely leading to the execution of a malicious payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b5.bin
660701e54e34cea8c1de11e578238bbdcbb7af74573496ca35531643568eb1fd		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB5 1613 bytes

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