RTF malware analysis — malicious · 790666229814b82c

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.3 KB First seen: 2019-11-20

MD5: 67c092156ed5bdc811624ba6376a2bbb SHA-1: 3638dd47abf04753bf4e39e676a9a59941fdcd20 SHA-256: 790666229814b82c78583a5adda3ef277a3f9eec30d90b2a78b56e269f89b0a9

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit technique. The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of this object, triggering the exploitation. This is a common method for delivering secondary payloads, though no specific payload or download URL was directly extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000033.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x33	2169 bytes
SHA-256: `db8e5184672ca74b638bbc61610ee15cccd88c5805242104d9035e8dea3fb151`

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