Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 78f95207d3f42432…

MALICIOUS

RTF

39.0 KB First seen: 2023-07-19
MD5: b1ebd98509cc584fcf8503982af45bdf SHA-1: 4c436805080aa48d21956ca007abb99ed4079b6a SHA-256: 78f95207d3f4243220077b94837952c1863a5ed08e370abaaeecdb8ca58e8d6a
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object and specifically targets the Equation Editor, a known vulnerability vector. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document prompts the user to enable editing, which is a common social engineering tactic to trigger the exploit. The embedded OLE object data is likely the exploit payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004e65.bin
a5003d408f3c1c06fe4fb2a1c0db70779577bd93d5af8e5bdc6595e2640884b4
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4E65 1511 bytes