Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 78dbc071e2eb7cbf…

MALICIOUS

PDF

68.6 KB Created: 2021-02-15 16:40:26 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 7a3df3e792791045a382f28cfde008a1 SHA-1: 5f187fa13aa3ab2ed41c87dd7c55119c79225464 SHA-256: 78dbc071e2eb7cbfa5323474b23640045cb94b240b6b06673c4b57c97381f13a
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicative of a link farm or SEO spam campaign. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs point towards an attempt to redirect users to potentially harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://druttle.ru/wb?keyword=how%20to%20certified%20mail PDF link annotation
    • https://jimatekazame.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134669874/zigafuturetuxitoluza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pebiname.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453048/jupimepipab-topetoka-kezetemuf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4383475/normal_601fd17eb78b5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kupepepa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874668/2cd8e150db610.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gufuvixenize.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135387571/1222465.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4380691/normal_5ff4dfbb78513.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://surevixa.22web.org/bajevitibatibemimum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ziduxaxeg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380546/9961369.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fovojewonot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134669065/xafofasuli-kugejegemo-xukusilumene.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fafotarume.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131069904/83254e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kaxesudinebeg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379803/sukupojuwad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nenafefetu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406263/3475568.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4445106/normal_6021a474562be.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gakafapokizi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135319358/tokutigoso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://dagajevefud.epizy.com/challenging_worksheets_for_2nd_graders.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xovijoj.epizy.com/xolozavinovo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mogorixonub.rf.gd/to_kill_a_mockingbird_workbook_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wozaloruwogilo.rf.gd/rumefobime.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d228.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD228 5044 bytes
SHA-256: 477005c4e2c1db1cc931992aaa20b5969ff3793e96e9e58ca5263dd8c42073c4
font_01_sfnt_off0000e346.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE346 10116 bytes
SHA-256: ae31fb8a66b9ce70f5bc64ae880770391d2ce30d37836cf8436405aa38fbd5c0