Emotet — Office (OOXML) / .XLSX malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 78bf88d078a4c220…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

115.1 KB Created: 2015-06-05 18:17:20 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 12.0000
MD5: f2f7e94f5508c3e3721778ada4730196 SHA-1: 3f0cef8cd96288ac0b30b8687e08fc87d53f950e SHA-256: 78bf88d078a4c220d21ad39f6e13d481335bed45f8041274ee04d3c27ef06557
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a Workbook_Open macro that uses CreateObject to execute a batch file and a VBScript. The VBScript is heavily obfuscated but appears to download and execute a second-stage payload from multiple URLs. The ClamAV detection name 'Xls.Downloader.EmotetExcel02223-9938902-0' strongly suggests the Emotet family.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.EmotetExcel02223-9938902-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.EmotetExcel02223-9938902-0
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
df1eb14c222394595c0518b49eec2b55ed9573146c5f1717dedceddd2e199a2b
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 12041 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
8059c3978656bb6c2d2a4ba157b3efc9951d24a61cedf6ba81bd7d8234d4c9b7
vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 42496 bytes