Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 78954ad2b7c3ae05…

MALICIOUS

PDF

159.7 KB Created: 2020-08-28 14:47:27 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 83bd21a1ef29a1bef40ce172822c7fad SHA-1: cddc287720b6a2062543c4fd8d2a403ce0f0848b SHA-256: 78954ad2b7c3ae05587be8c753bef3489ad29de1df6da15c3bd62a9211888c91
94 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a link that redirects to a known malicious domain, identified by the PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK heuristic. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the same malicious URL. This suggests the primary purpose of the document is to trick the user into visiting the malicious URL, likely as part of a phishing or malware distribution scheme.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=descargar+arbatel+de+magia+veterum+pdf+espa%25C3%25B1ol
    • http://files.teptu.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132712072/9646547.pdf
    • http://rodakoku.mrgraney.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408024/jiduvibaze-puwesa-sasuduzupox-dutotepigoramas.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/6900/4190/files/free_queen_platform_bed_storage_plans.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/62114329075.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/7217/3733/files/vuwufatenutiwonixutax.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/7086/4025/files/berebilaxerajuronodifisat.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/0790/9794/files/77590878513.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/1720/5920/files/54613163126.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0465/1230/8382/files/66414569170.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/negonarufefozosaburesid.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/8040/8474/files/gatodegewawuzuxi.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00021eee.bin
466e8e8dbdbd09c16c143acf7e0da7a415a97668399d8621e312cbfd8faa858b		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x21EEE 5660 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0002321b.bin
53b915c09104a18083d42f57981b5479b47565935355f76ef704a122b7df6f93		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2321B 15024 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0002608e.bin
d1f4a20f0e35a0564be54678b929bb8c711862c507f070c2b9a6abea8daf4378		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2608E 4324 bytes

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