Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7890cd85c88c7e2d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

98.7 KB Created: 2021-07-25 12:41:29 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 8538ac68d6e15643b0483639a26fd8c9 SHA-1: 9dda18a8bd985680596aecbd760627907c61fef6 SHA-256: 7890cd85c88c7e2d0b6a74be180db18e12141f88d541fa285f5f437758140b3d
264 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The file is identified as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, exhibiting characteristics of an advance-fee scam and urgency lure. It contains numerous links to external PDFs hosted on compromised WordPress sites and disposable domains, suggesting a phishing or credential harvesting attempt. The presence of PDF-specific heuristics like URI pointing to raw IP addresses and compromised CMS uploads further supports a malicious intent to redirect users to potentially harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9981

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Advance-fee lottery/parcel scam lure high SE_ADVANCE_FEE_SCAM_LURE
    Document contains lottery/beneficiary or prize language together with large-value draft/funds wording and parcel/courier delivery requirements. This is a classic advance-fee fraud document shape.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://christembassyromford.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/17c6ae18cf7359043192ad9ab6d99520/judinaropejemawumiwinazin.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://haniltm.kr/upfiles/editor/files/54231369291.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://airshow-bg.com/file/7760480020.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sealordhotels.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/1946752148.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://walterchiropracticclinic.com/home/walter/public_html/ckfinder/userfiles/files/56424223269.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tscyw.net/userfiles/file/20210701010623_1lhkjg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://104.156.58.56/~web2inbox/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ad99c64da57---16026582253.pdfPDF link annotation
    • https://mamadona.ru/ckfinder/userfiles/files/zadalusizedunuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://northstarexecutivesearch.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0af617373cfba9a921b3383e8aeb9b4d/94485460992.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cameronhaddock.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608ca95da306c---74894898416.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.tekkoo.net/images/library/File/23460011840.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.canadiantreasurer.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160f26c6b19fa4---senibadoxudasufab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rmdschoolandcollege.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/92p48thbed3j1oblgrgf5fcqs1/68205904603.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.espymetcalf.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d82d85265ce---52921533546.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aldurra.ly/images-editeur/img/file/mizazamimiboxarusokekumu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.hkwebdesign.com.hk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a208fc42a2b---bukotosewagajo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.a-fairys-choice.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d617f10047b---kuxelapapurunexesarokox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://choiceenergynetwork.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f06fcc14d2eb561b3447972ab1183366/47155975460.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://appfacile.it/file/16794917448.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wisserarm.nl/app/webroot/files/userfiles/files/bixudevinuxawafiburo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bjoybrands.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160855a47274ee---99755576625.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://duext.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7fbe6d111a780fc6da135c8de8e81ea8/34938924170.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://joeun-it.com/userData/board/file/75083704754.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://slowjamsundays.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b752eeed337---61137047008.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/PmAiG5ZyT-k/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+get+free+followers+on+tiktok+fast+without+human+verificationPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00011b74.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11B74 17608 bytes
SHA-256: 0e2e21bcae85e4f3572f07b38812e7a3d64647519a30de6c35932dc1b7746d4e
font_01_sfnt_off00014991.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14991 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off000161a8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x161A8 11116 bytes
SHA-256: 2cbbd18e1d2f9254e7f8d2efe7aa0edc5bef34afa80225c171e39b4d585f36e2

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