Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 78810210c01051ed…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.5 KB Created: 2021-06-11 05:44:38 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: 6e9b63704e99ae09558af4c8d9518dfb SHA-1: 5c3cb720b39e6704d26c0db3c622fd35f1e9991a SHA-256: 78810210c01051edab61eac03598ee2acbb7faafd6490fb8ba35fcc5c6fb9ca3
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was flagged as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text related to activating Windows 10, a common lure for phishing or malware delivery. Crucially, a heuristic indicates a 'Clipboard command execution lure,' suggesting the document instructs users to copy commands into a shell. This points towards an attack pattern where the user is tricked into executing malicious commands, likely to download and run a second-stage payload from one of the embedded URLs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://queure.ru/uplcv?utm_term=activate+windows+10+2020+cmd PDF link annotation
    • https://lsp.od.ua/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/g743jja909e3cfrv9qucprcl33/89107206815.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://russkiivopros.com/images/FCKeditor/file/xunamikugepimitonilotobur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://readxyz.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d8fc72bdac92d06fbf2dfec336db7676/38577284990.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hillcountryawningsandsunscreens.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607462c1991d1---49918778127.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dyglas.com/userData/board/file/82708436763.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://coimbra.hu/uploads/ckfinder/userfiles/files/fitodij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jnfarley.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/g5ti6aor4q75g21gpv6gij7c01/risevifudabinironubi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.m2asolutions.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/073e0f50298e2c0510cc9dde35df5342/limutovolivimawerinewe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fieldofgreen.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ef88b04c546c6bb93ddf179bdb63414d/zilegon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xn--80aaa1anac6cg.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/29576761d753814b7175e1d4a3fae556/67588485966.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.heracles-hotel.eu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/g2rntdfhheod83jkuf1djfef3h/44098881283.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bowenpainter.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160afa2ba3cfd0---xafabadapagi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://planbmedia.hufiles/82440954566.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://carpanea.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/355940cfb5e93749aab984f5a93d4c8a/lekixerivojumulemopemit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://christianboudreau.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608ba7c3421ad---jupejusomavifewabexi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.elektrobetrieb-scholz.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607e0e1a9c36c---girenebitiviribetuxafep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.taxikladis.gr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607be7c0bbe55---tuviwugozinebedovefalitos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.pennlighting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/92927f1fad38710e3e7ba5e5560848e1/52548522864.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vietnaminsight.biz/ckfinder/userfiles/files/rixabulomipoporixixevis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://shotclock.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7b146e4678521fa1a5d905170ab78bc1/pusojasuvifolozudituxuzen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f234.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF234 5424 bytes
SHA-256: e49997334f4b8117e876b57c5db2330ce4c4d660a920bc68f38729b6c5d7c0bb
font_01_sfnt_off000104b4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x104B4 11860 bytes
SHA-256: 6d3a810daf37b8fceaaf9ce6aac99eef64bda5435c977b776bbb88334cb73492

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.