Malicious Office (OLE) / .PPT — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7879b728bed07414…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .PPT

224.0 KB Created: 2006-08-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office PowerPoint
MD5: 69f2813f068b8c9270d0b69f6dd78528 SHA-1: 8f620e528433565019a2d1431b982294eff4d63c SHA-256: 7879b728bed074142e5c16abd16c118e6c733ebea29e8a822a1d6ab6afc7e15c
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The Auto_Close VBA macro is obfuscated and uses a character-shift decoder to construct a command that is then executed via Shell(). The decoded command appears to be a URL that likely hosts a second-stage payload. The macro's intent is to download and execute this payload.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • VBA character-shift decoded Shell command critical OLE_VBA_ASC_CHR_SHIFT_SHELL
    VBA auto-exec macro stores an encoded command string, decodes it with a Mid/Asc/Chr character-shift loop, and passes the recovered text to Shell. This is a high-confidence command stager.
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://%8234%8234@j.mp/ddkjasidqowpqwmbgdkdkw

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
3b67c44860b1dbddcba83abda321528248d256d2ab13293486b0fb2cfe177877		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 47968 bytes

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